Types of Research Designs
Sanctions do not produce the explicitly intended results in most cases, while in others they do. In this research, the effectiveness of sanctions on nuclear hub North Korea is established. In theory, sanctions are aimed to constrict a country’s economy instead of coercing the leadership into a positive policy change. Based on this idea, only one out of three of the proposed turnover is achieved (Bapat and Morgan 2009). This research focuses on causes of failure of sanctions against North Korea.
Furthermore, it will help to show how the country has managed to survive and even start thriving in the midst of increased sanctions from United States (US), Japan, China, European Union and North Korea among others (Noland 2009). The methodology used is the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the current economy in relation to the previous one. Through this we aim to establish what loopholes exist in these bans. From the results obtained on the gaps in the imposition of restrictions, new informed policies will be created to address the issue.
Importance of a Quantitative and Qualitative Approach
In a quantitative approach, the unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral business relationships techniques are used to numerically define a country’s economic power. The findings can then be utilized to identify the right type of sanctions. Deterrents can be created to coerce, constrain, or push for a new political era all while protecting the human rights of civilians and not the leaders (Sung 2009). Sequential and gravity models are majorly used. In the gravity model, a bilateral relationship between the sum of imports and exports against exports is established. In this method, the nation’s main suppliers of technological aspects and nuclear materials for creating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are identified. The step is followed by the establishment of the main buyers of the product and what channels are used (Lieggi et al 2010). Finding a clear ratio of the production cost and market price of the manufactures will be the basis of the types of sanctions and on which products and states.
The sequential model approach, on the other hand, is used to identify what sanction should be placed at what stage. The first phase is the creation of an economic vacuum. This stage’s success depends on three variables including the identity of the level of bans to be imposed on a country from small insignificant restrictions, such as travel bans, to in-depth ones, for example, the stoppage of any transactions with the rest of the world (Lektzian & Patterson 2015). Having this imposition will be more damaging on economies that rely majorly on international trade, unlike those that depend on their gross domestic product. The last variable has key stakeholders in the specific goods supplied by the nation to support the sanction, leading to loss of critical markets.
Upon economically constraining an economy, the next phase is creating enough political pressure to force behavioral change in the country in terms of existing policies. For an effective coercion, a sanction has to identify the main political influence in the region based on the purchasing power and political interest (Bapat et al. 2013). The next step is instigating change in leadership through democratic elections, impeachment, or planned succession using military revolutions or otherwise. Finally, research is done to align the target state mentality to swiftly change the required policies. The process can be done through the reinforcement of beliefs that failure to change will lead to a devastating longtime collapse of the economy.
With a collapsed economy and enough political pressure for a change, a state has to find ways to create a potential compromise or agreement area. In this phase, the numerical establishment of the amount incurred in the proliferation of nuclear embargoes should be tabulated. The stage is followed by developing ways of the sanctioned country to benefit economically in the event of termination of the production of WMD without the achievement of the intended financial gain.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Quantitative Approach
The qualitative approach is the best method as it provides the exact numbers of effects of a specific ban. The figures can be tabulated and used to identify areas that have been most affected. The numbers provide a basis for an informed decision on what additional sanctions should be imposed or removed. However, obtaining the exact figures of the current Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Production (GDP) in a sanctioned country is nearly impossible. The data may be manipulated to fool the entire world of what happens in the state. The figures may be lower than the revenue acquired to make the country that imposed restrictions to lift some. Furthermore, getting data from black market areas is a hurdle as the traders are disguised as different people, and the payment may be made to untraceable overseas accounts. As a result, the profits made despite the sanctions cannot be associated directly to the dealers.
To overcome this shortcoming, collected data, no matter how small, should be considered and compared to existing information of other countries with similar sanctions. An example is comparing data on restrictions placed on North Korea and Iran (Kim & Lee 2019). Since both nations have a relatively equal purchase power, their outputs should be relatively the same. Finding similarities in the states’ national reports can be key to establishing a comprehensive output of their revenue and if the sanctions are effective.
In this approach we aim to establish the main reason for failure of these sanctions. The responses are combined with the quantitative results to establish what measures are to be taken. For effective results, research will be done through structured group discussions, interviews with expert observers in sanctions and through observations of countries with similar bans.
Because of the varied level of diligence from the all the stake holders, results obtained can be fully based on to portray what trend these sanctions take and what works in what areas. To start off group discussions from various quotas can be relied on to obtain insight on various areas that a single researcher may not know. The experts on the other hand due to their experience in the matter and professionalism they can be relied on to direct the research on what parameters to look out for in effective of sanctions. Finally interviews from civilians and press releases can be used too.
While qualitative approach is marred with bias, collecting data from all quotas and classes of the country can mitigate this. In the case of North Korea, the country thrives on citizen oppression (Byman and Lind 2010). The fear of speaking ill of their leader can lead to false or incorrect opinions about the actual state of economy. To prevent such incidences gathered information should be carried out in confidentiality and I some cases in anonymity. Moreover, the samples collected large enough and have a representative of all political, economic, and cultural classes of individuals. The median or commonality from the data should be obtained. Furthermore, the researcher should pose neutral questions that show no affiliations on either side of the sanctions. For example, since most sanctions placed on North Korea are by the United States, having a US-based researcher will cause a negative perception of the investigation. The study may be viewed as a way to add sanctions, causing the answers to be falsified to prevent this case.
Relating Data to Theory
The strategic goods theory advocates the banning of specified products that are key to a country’s GNP and GDP to devastate its’ economy so that it can change its policies. Applying this theory is impossible due to the interconnection in trading partnership, availability of lucrative assets in foreign states, and black markets that make traceability of monies impossible. Furthermore, prohibiting one product in given markets will make a state strategize on how to supply its commodities through other allies. An example is political, economic, and individuals due to North Korea’s production and distribution of nuclear weapons (Haggard & Noland 2010). The nation’s president trades and travels to China in convoys and does business with it despite the travel ban (Feng 2009). While the primary goal of sanctions is to devastate citizens so that they can instigate a regime overhaul, the restrictions only end up profiting leaders, while civilians live in abject poverty.
Basing on the sequential approach, sanctions in North Korea have failed massively due to several factors. First, the coercion to change of behavior has not succeeded as the decision makers, in most instances the United Nations council, lack first-hand experience of the occurrences in the specified country. Furthermore, when neighboring nations such as Iran have similar bans, the situation creates a commonality in adversary, which fosters the sprouting of unlikely markets (Boulden and Charron 2010). However, the Kimberly process reinforces the positive effectiveness of a restriction.
The second finding is that economic constraints, though effective, have detrimental effects. The primary goal of international law is to protect citizens of a country and hold rogue leaders into account if crimes against humanity are committed. The paradox in sanctions is that they break almost all basic human right to force the civilians to push for a regime change (Eckes 2012). A nation’s economic collapse causes citizens to live in abject poverty besides the oppressive leadership through tax increment and lack of internet freedom (Apolte 2012). This action in turn pushes for the removal of sanctions due to the breaking of human rights.
For non-proliferated economic sanctions, government assets and properties should be frozen and the state restricted from accessing loans from international institutions until a positive change in a given country is seen (Miller 2014). Imposing travel bans on leaders and diplomatic constraints on potential succession heads should be encouraged as it forces the administration to change the stipulated policies.
Final findings are on the strategies to signal change using the carrot stick approach. Despite the increase in the number of sanctions against North Korea, it has successfully established allies that do not support the restriction placed on it by the United States (Crawford & Klotz 2017). The associates include countries such as China, which are among the main suppliers and buyers of North Korea’s products. Nations, for example, Russia and Ukraine that major in arms and weapons dealership use this sanction to act as the broker of goods for North Korea (Forrer 2017). As a result, the countries’ allegiance grows, and since no economic loss is felt by the state, the intended effect of the ban is not attained. However, there’s no primary data collection, so there is no significant ethical consideration.
Second, North Korea has invested massively in its nuclear proliferation program. Forcing the country to abandon the project in the middle will lead to huge economic losses that may cripple the nation economically. This factor forces the country to try to survive through the ban rather than oblige. Embracing strategizing such as phased or synchronized denuclearization should be considered (Glaser & Mian 2018). Moreover, North Korea’s mineral exports have been forbidden to 90% of the total exports. The removal of some prohibitions, for example, chief mineral exports that include coal and iron core by UNSC 2270, 2371, and 2375 and other diplomatic vetoes, for instance, travel injunctions, is helpful (Rathbone & Jeydel 2017). In addition, North Koreas’ economy trade accounted for 15% of the country’s GDP in 1994 but increased to over 46% in 2010 due to the opening of new markets. In 2015, exports accounted for 47% of the country’s GNP, and 51% of them went to China, valued at $2.5 billion (Rathbone & Jeydel 2017). These figures mean despite a large number of economic sanctions placed on North Korea, the state continues to thrive financially, rendering the bans ineffective.
Furthermore, the positive effectiveness of the bans on North Korea is based primarily on the political push of Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Ironically, according to the CNBC (2017) magazine, China was part of the key stakeholders in drafting more stringent sanctions against North Korea, yet the nation is the main economic beneficiary (Oh & Ryu 2011). As a result, China does not want to destabilize the current regime, but rather stabilize it for economic gains. To achieve this goal despite the purported allegiance with the US, the country strongly stood against the addition of more sanctions on Kim Jong-un leadership.
The effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea is a complex issue due to opacity in domestic life, oligopoly in politics, and the country’s size. In addition, leadership is hierarchical from generation to the next, rendering citizens incapable of determining who should lead them. However, there is hope as the previously dominant military groups and bureaucrats, which were the pillars for the leadership structure, keep marginalizing. The US should also ensure that North Korea sees negotiations for a peace treaty rather than a security strategy to remove the skepticism of the deal. Application of smart and specific sanctions should also be done to ensure they maximally achieve their intended policies.
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